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INTRODUCTION
International trade law traditionally covered issues such as tariffs,
customs administration, dumping, subsidies, and safeguards.' As a
Strategy and Policy Faculty, School of Business, Georgetown University.
** Center for International Earth Science Information Network, Columbia
University.
*** Research Center for Advanced Science and Technology, University of To-
kyo.
1. See, e.g. JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND
POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS (1991) (discussing a number of
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result, trade and foreign ministries primarily conducted multilateral
trade negotiations.2 However, in the Uruguay Round, the policy
scope expanded to include issues such as services and intellectual
property rights.3 The broader trade policy agenda multiplied not only
the participants and interests at the negotiation table, but also the in-
formation needs of the negotiators. With the advent of the Uruguay
Round, international trade lawmaking became international eco-
nomic lawmaking. Toward that end, knowledge of the world econ-
omy became central to the process of international lawmaking.
Building upon the functional theory of international governmental
organizations ("IGOs") and drawing from the organizational theory
of knowledge management, we conceptualize IGOs as knowledge
managers, organizations with the capabilities to support multilateral
trade and economic lawmaking processes. States create IGOs to fur-
ther their wealth of knowledge; IGOs transfer information better than
global markets. Moreover, states create IGOs to accumulate and dis-
seminate knowledge, and thereby reduce international transaction
costs.
IGOs are essentially "learners," 4 as they acquire new information
traditional international law issues, policies and rules).
2. See, e.g. GERARD CURZON, MULTILATERAL COMMERCIAL DIPLOMACY:
THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE AND ITS IMPACT ON NATIONAL
COMMERCIAL POLICIES AND TECHNIQUE (1965) (discussing whether the General
Agreement on Tarriffs and Trade is the best method of addressing the challenges
of the marketplace in 1965); see also ERNEST H. PREEN, TRADERS AND
DIPLOMATS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE KENNEDY ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS UNDER
THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE (1970) (revealing the agree-
ment terms and international effects of the Kennedy Round Negotiations);
GILBERT R. WINHAM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE TOKYO ROUND
NEGOTIATION 15-57 (1986) (explaining the developments that led up to the signing
of the Tokyo Round and the implementation and aftermath of the signing).
3. See generally WENDY DOBSON & PIERRE JACQUET, FINANCIAL SERVICES
LIBERALIZATION IN THE WTO 80-95 (1998); MICHAEL P. RYAN, KNOWLEDGE
DIPLOMACY: GLOBAL COMPETITION AND THE POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY 113-19 (1998) (providing in-depth discussions on the effects of the fi-
nancial services agreement in the World Trade Organization regarding cross-
border trade and market access in financial services).
4. See Martha Finnemore, International Organizations as Teachers of Norins:
The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization and Sci-
ence Policy, 47 INT'L ORG. 565 (1993) (exploring the role of international organi-
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in order to be disseminators of knowledge. Each IGO possesses dis-
tinctive domains of knowledge, including strengths and weaknesses
with respect to institutional capabilities. The knowledge accumula-
tion and management of the IGO is central to the shared-knowledge
of an international regime, thereby making the IGO the crucial coop-
eration-facilitating institution in a given area of international rela-
tions. We present an analytic framework for the investigation of IGO
capabilities and capacities as knowledge managers in future interna-
tional trade and trade-related law-making negotiations.
This paper begins with a discussion of the seminal role of knowl-
edge in the functional theory of international governmental organi-
zation as presented in the 1930s and beyond. We address the empha-
sis placed on IGOs by functionalist international relations scholars,
international legal scholars, and political scientists, each within the
realm of international relations. Next, we analyze the shift to the
study of international regimes and the resulting theoretical and em-
pirical neglect of IGO study. Additionally, we examine the organiza-
tional theory of knowledge management for application to the study
of international governmental organization, especially with respect to
those with possible utility to future trade and trade-related lawmak-
ing negotiations. We conclude with a discussion of implications for
theory and policy surrounding IGOs.
I. KNOWLEDGE AND THE FUNCTIONAL
THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENTAL
ORGANIZATION
In the 1930s, a school of American and British international rela-
tions theorists known as "functionalists" explained that two pivotal
trends had changed the nature of political authority in international
affairs. First, technological advances in transportation (the railroad
and the steamship) and communication (the telegraph and the tele-
phone) were integrating markets geographically. As a result, the
heightened competition was producing more market specialization.'
zations in introducing societal norms).
5. See, e.g. DAVID MITRANY, THE PROGRESS OF INTERNATIONAL
GOVERNMENT 10-11, 41-42 (1993) and DAVID MITRANY, A WORKING PEACE
SYSTEM 97-141 (1966) (explaning the role of traditional nationalism in the nuclear
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Increasing market specialization, they posited, was changing the very
nature of knowledge. Ancient Greek philosophers, such as Aristotle,
introduced rigorous method to knowledge and systematic category to
what was known. Nevertheless, knowledge remained rather general,
for two millennia.6 The sailing vessel had transported knowledge of
paper and printing, porcelain and pottery, silk and textiles, and spices
and crops as well as the products themselves. However, it was the
railroad, steamship, telegraphy and telephony that revolutionized
both commercial markets and United States politics in a manner un-
precedented in world history.7
Second, argued functionalists-notably, David Mitrany-the peo-
ples of the world were placing increasing demand on their political
leaders for higher standards of material welfare. The age of "let them
eat cake" had ended. It became more apparent that increased wealth
and prosperity depended upon the economic efficiency and growth
fostered by competition and technology; each contingent upon glob-
ally integrated markets. In order to establish a truly world economy,
the world's political leaders felt popular pressure to cooperate inter-
nationally regarding trade liberalization, product standardization, and
monetary independence. Politicians needed functional, technocratic
specialists to achieve international cooperation under conditions of
increasingly complex markets.
The functionalist school contended that the growing influence of
transnational, functional, technocratic specialists meant a corre-
sponding diminution in the influence of national politicians. National
age, where mankind must learn to rely on its members).
6. Even in the culturally rich societies of China, India, East and South Asia,
Persia, and the Middle East, knowledge was limited until the Enlightenment values
and institutions in Western Europe established the means to intellectual progress.
See Toby E. Huff, THE RISE OF EARLY MODERN SCIENCE: ISLAM, CHINA, AND THE
WEST (1993).
7. See ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL
REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS 360-64 (1977) (rooting the managerial, cor-
porate, capitalist revolution in turn-of-the-century American business, when new
opportunities arose due to advances in transportation and communication); see also
MARTIN J. SKLAR, THE CORPORATE RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM,
1890-1916 33-40 (1988) (showing that the rise of managerial corporate capitalism
reformed American Government into a liberal regulatory state). Subsequent schol-
arship underscores the astute insights of the functionalist historians of the 1930s.
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politicians would give way to transnational technocrats in the making
of public policy. One scholar explained their thinking: "International
conflict is best tamed by entrusting the work of increasing human
welfare to experts, technical specialists, and their professional asso-
ciations. Being interested in tasks rather than power, they can be ex-
pected to achieve agreement where statesmen will fail.'" Thus, as the
allocators of human values, states would recede in international rela-
tions. Self-interested bargaining among sovereigns would give way
to efficiency and public welfare-motivated management by special-
ists. "World government would be gradually built upon a series of
sectoral bases" according to the functionalists.' The functionalist
school believed politics and international relations were changing for
the better.
Functionalists pointed to the rise, in the second half of the nine-
teenth century, of IGOs as forums for international law and policy-
making as evidence of this change.'0 The war years, in the judgement
of functionalist scholars, evidenced their theories and propagated
their ideas amongst policymakers to mend international relations.
American, British, and French policymakers founded many IGOs at
the conclusion of World War II, including the United Nations
8. ERNEST B. HAAS, BEYOND THE NATION STATE, FUNCTIONALISM AND
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 11 (1964) (distinguishing functionalist thought
from standard internationalization).
9. ROBERT W. COX ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF INFLUENCE: DECISION MAKING
IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 403 (1973) (explaining the functionalist theory
regarding the transition of authority from states to world organizations).
10. See HAROLD K. JACOBSON, NETWORKS OF INTERDEPENDENCE:
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THE GLOBAL POLITICAL SYSTEM 397-410
(2d ed. 1984) (offering an exhaustive list of IGOs, categorized according to typol-
ogy of membership (limited or potentially universal) and purpose (general or spe-
cific)). The International Telecommunications Union was founded in 1865, the
World Meteorological Organization in 1873, the International Bureau of Weights
and Measures in 1875, the International Union for the Protections of Industrial
Property in 1883, the International Union for the Protection of Literary and Artistic
Works in 1886, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in 1889, the International Un-
ion for the Publication of Customs Tariffs in 1890, the International Labor Organi-
zation in 1919, the International Criminal Police Commission in 1923, the Interna-
tional Bureau of Education in 1925, the International Institute for the Unification
of Private Law in 1926, and the Bank for International Settlements in 1930. Id. at
408-10.
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("UN"), the International Monetary Fund ("IMF"), the World Bank,
and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT").
Ninety-four percent of today's IGOs were founded after 1939.
More than a thousand IGOs have been established to promote multi-
lateral cooperation in specific functional domains of international
relations." Certain IGOs, e.g., the UN and the European Union may
be described as whole "families" of sibling, special-function 
IGOs.2'
The functionalist scholars of international relations draw fiom the
teachings of the New Haven "world public order" school of interna-
tional law scholars, including Myres McDougal, Harold Lasswell,
Percy Corbett, and Richard Falk. 3 Myres McDougal explained that
"there are inescapable interdependencies throughout the world in re-
source potentialities and in institutional structures by which values
are produced and distributed" and "that people make increasing
identifications with larger and larger groups, from the family or lo-
cality to world community."14 He believed that positive values-re-
spect for private property, liberty, human dignity-could be maxi-
mized in the world only when the political boundaries of nation
states could be overcome through the growth of a network of inter-
national organizations. He maintained that "a chief impediment to
achieving such realistic orientation, and the creation of the institu-
tions necessary... has been and is the habit of peoples identifying
themselves with the state.""5 Percy Corbett wrote, "world order pre-
sumes world community under law; but this is not necessarily a
11. See Harold K. Jacobson et al., National Entanglements in International
Government Organization, 80 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 141, 144 (1986) (offering sta-
tistical background on the development of international government organiza-
tions); see also JACOBSON, supra note 10.
12. See Cheryl Shanks et al., Inertia and Change in the Constellation of Inter-
national Government Organizations, 50 INT'L ORG. 594, 603 (1996) (showing that
IGOs can be compared to and traced by lineage, having birth, death, and survival
rates).
13. Myres McDougal, Harold Lasswell, and Percy Corbett taught at Yale's
Law School. Richard Falk studied with them and has carried forward the research
tradition.
14. MYRES S. McDOUGAL & DAVID HABER, PROPERTY, WEALTH, LAND:
ALLOCATION, PLANNING, AND DEVELOPMENT-SELECTED CASES AND OTIIER
MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY iii (1948) [hereinafter.
15. See id- at 1203.
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community of state; it may be a community of individuals, tran-
scending states."' 6 Richard Falk viewed the state system as inherently
unstable due to inequality in wealth and power. He explained a func-
tionalist "logic of supranationalism" and institutionalization which
was transforming international relations through "non-traumatic"
17
means.
McDougal believed that the individual, not the nation-state, should
be thought of as the "ultimate beneficiary" of international law. ' On
the other hand, Hegel's glorification of the state valued the human
institution more than the human being. Hegel felt this had the practi-
cal effect of stripping people of their dignity and denying them pro-
tection from government abuse. McDougal said himself that his "ul-
timate goal is to create and preserve an universal order of human
dignity through clarification and implementation."" He believed the
creation of a network of international organizations, with the UN as
the focal point, to be primary in achieving universal respect for hu-
man dignity. To him the UN concept was "heir to all the great his-
toric democratic movements-for constitutionalism, freedom, equal-
ity, fraternity, humanitarianism, liberalism, enlightenment, peace,
and opportunity and so on." 0
16. PERCY E. CORBETT, THE GROWTH OF WORLD LA\W 10 (1971) (explaining
that world order is a goal to aspire to or achieve).
17. See RICHARD A. FALK, A STUDY OF FUTURE WORLDS 150 (1975) (ex-
plaining Falk's analysis and theory on the future changes to occur concerning gov-
emments and world order).
18. See Myres S. McDougal & Gertrude C.K. Leighton. The Rights oJMan in
the World Conununity: Constitutional Illusions Versius Rational .lction, in,
STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 330, 363 (McDougal et. al., eds 1960) (criti-
cizing the commonplace view that traditional international law concerns itself only
with states, and not individuals).
19. See Myres S. McDougal & Harold Lasswell. The Ilentification and Ap-
praisal of Diverse Systems of Public Order, in STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER
3, 16 (McDougal et. al., eds 1960). Five intellectual tasks will assist in achieving
the goal of clarifying and aiding in implementing a universal order of human dig-
nity: (1) clarify the goal; (2) understand and describe the social trends; (3) analyze
conditioning factors; (4) project future developments: and (5) invent and consider
policy alternatives. See id. at 16-17.
20. McDougal, supra note 18, at 336 (praising the United Nations Charter as
the culmination of mankind's struggle for basic human values).
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However, McDougal was not an idealist given to trite visions of
world utopia. He concurred with Hans Morganthau's post-war ex-
planation of international relations as fundamentally about power."
McDougal put forth a pragmatic research program, which recognized
the reality of a fundamentally de-centralized world system composed
of sovereign, power-seeking nation-states. He posited that, even for
the righteous goal of the establishment of worldwide respect for hu-
man rights and dignity, democratic adherents should not attempt to
impose their values upon non-democratic, repressive governments by
means of violence. To McDougal, violence of this kind destroyed
values, making the means not worth the ends.22
However, McDougal stated in a 1959 presidential address to the
American Society of International Law that "it need not be stipu-
lated... that the principle of minimum order requires the suicidal ac-
ceptance of peace at any price. ' ' 23 Within McDougal's worldview, the
measure was the maximization of values, and because values such as
enlightenment, religious tolerance, wealth, and respect could not be
maximized once lost, the threat or use of force by an attacker de-
manded self-defense. Furthermore, he believed that self-defense may
be extended, in some circumstances, to aggressive pursuit of military
victory against an evil greater than the use of violence itself, articu-
lating the theory of "just war".
Nevertheless, unlike the realist school, McDougal believed that
concerted institutionalization of international law and organizations,
paired with judicious use of state power, would produce a world
public order, substantially improving the social, economic, and po-
21. See HANS J. MORGANTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE
FOR POWER AND PEACE (1948).
22. See Myers S. McDougal & Florentino P. Feleciano, Resort to Coercion:
Aggression and Self-Defense in Policy Perspective, in LAW AND MINIMUM PUBLIC
ORDER: THE LEGAL REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL COERCION 128, 188 (Myers
S. McDougal & Florentino Feleciano eds., 1961) [hereinafter LAW AND MINIMUM
PUBLIC ORDER] (stating that all law depends on common interests and common
values of participants).
23. Myres S. McDougal, Perspectives for an International Law of Human Dig-
nity, in STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 1001 (McDougal et. al., eds 1960).
Minimum order is the principle that force is to be used only to preserve order, not
to expand values. Id. at 1000.
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litical lot of the world's citizens. McDougal and his New Haven
world public order school, thereby reinforced the functionalist em-
phasis upon the activities of international law and organization rather
than the activities of states, separating themselves further from the
political scientists who became increasingly focused on the behavior
of states in international relations.24
Another leading scholar of international law, Louis Henkin, wrote
that, "[i]n relations between nations, the progress of civilization may
be seen as movement from force to diplomacy, from diplomacy to
law.' z- Henkin investigated international law as it was actually lived
in the foreign policy of states. Analyzing the actions of states and
IGOs with respect to a host of issues in international law, he con-
cluded that states create a good deal of public international law and,
by and large, comply with the laws they establish. Henkin recognized
the reality of both states and IGOs as actors within international re-
lations and did not contemplate the transformation of the state system
into a supranational system. With his state-centrality premise and
empiricism, Henkin can be seen as a bridge between academic inter-
national law and academic international relations.
The functionalist prediction that IGO technocrats would supplant
state policymakers as the most important decision-makers in world
politics never came to fruition. States have clung to their sovereign
claims of independence despite deepening global interdependence. :'
A group of international relations scholars conducted a major, sys-
tematic empirical study of "decision making in international organi-
zation" by investigating behavior within IGOs such as the Interna-
tional Labor Organization ("ILO"), the UN Environmental, Social
and Cultural Organization ("UNESCO"), GATT, and the UN Coun-
24. For explanations of when benefit of force outweighs the cost of loss to
peace and order, see, e.g. Connunit' Regulation of Combat Situations, in LAW
AND MINIMUM PUBLIC ORDER 550 (Myers S. McDougal & Florentino Feleciano
eds., 1961); Resort to Coercion, in LAW AND MINIMUM PUBLIC ORDER 121 (Myers
S. McDougal & Florentino Feleciano eds., 1961).
25. Louis HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 1
(1979) (opening his discussion on the evolution of civilization).
26. See HAAS, supra note 8, at 23 ("The distinction between the political and
the technical, between the politician and the expert, simply does not hold because
issues were made technical by a prior political decision.").
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cil on Trade and Development ("UNCTAD").f Though the investi-
gators placed considerable emphasis upon the behavior of states, they
did so within the context of a detailed study of IGOs. This study
would prove to be the last substantial study of IGOs as organizations.
II. INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENTAL
ORGANIZATIONS AS KNOWLEDGE MANAGERS
In his influential After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the
World Political Economy, International relations scholar Robert
Keohane argued that sovereign, self-interest seeking states cooperate
multilaterally-or not-in order to achieve their national goals in
world politics and the world political economy. Moreover, Keohane
contended that, from a rational choice perspective, states establish
what he called "international regimes" to facilitate the efforts.2 " In
Keohane's terms, international regimes are a "governing arrange-
ment" for transnational and interstate relations, 9 i.e., "sets of implicit
or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures
around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of inter-
national relations"; principles are "beliefs of fact, causation, and rec-
titude"; norms are "standards of behavior defined in terms of rights
and obligations"; rules are "specific prescriptions or proscriptions for
action"; decision-making procedures are "prevailing practices for
making and implementing collective choice."',
Drawing an analogy to industrial organization explanations for the
existence of firms in the commercial marketplace, Keohane asserted
that international regimes exist because they reduce the costs of in-
27. For the details of the study and its findings, see Cox, supra note 9.
28. ROBERT O. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN
THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY (1984).
29. See ROBERT 0. KEOHANE AND JOSEPH S. NYE, POWER AND
INTERDEPENDENCE: WORLD POLITICS IN TRANSITION 5 (1977) (referring to gov-
ernment actions that dictate and regulate international relations).
30. Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Re-
gines as Intervening Variables, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 1, 2 (Stephen D.
Krasner ed., Cornell Univ. Press 1983). This collection of essays was initiated by
then editor Robert Keohane and first delivered by successor editor Stephen Kras-
ner in volumes 35 and 36 of INT'L ORG.
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terstate transactions in international relations." International regimes
"mak[e] it cheaper for governments to get together to negotiate
agreements," "reduce transaction costs of legitimate bargains and in-
crease them for illegitimate ones," "organize issue-areas so that pro-
ductive linkages (those that facilitate agreements consistent with the
principles of the regime) are facilitated, while destructive linkages
and bargains that are inconsistent with regime principles are discour-
aged," and reduce information asymmetries because "'some actors
may know more about a situation than others.' 2
Under Keohane's leadership, political scientists largely shifted
their collective attention to the application of the international regime
conceptual framework of international relations. Two young schol-
ars, reviewing the then fledgling international regime research pro-
gram, recommended erasure of the conventional boundary between
studies of international relations and domestic politics."
Indeed, the international regime research program had produced
considerable social-scientific progress along several related research
lines, especially that international relations are "two-level bargaining
games" conducted simultaneously intrastate as well as interstate" and
that "ideas" or beliefs animate international relations and political
outcomes as much as do national interests.' A plethora of scholar-
31. See KEOHANE, supra note 29, at 89-94. Once a regime is established, the
regime is less expensive for a state to deal with as a source of information than it
would be if the regime did not exist at all. See id. at 90; see also William G. Ouchi,
Markets, Bureaucracies, and Clans, 25 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 129 (1980) (explaining that
organizations arise in response to needs for efficiency).
32. Keohane, supra note 29, at 90-93.
33. See Stephan Haggard & Beth A. Simmons. Theories qf International Re-
gimes, 47 INT'L ORG. 491 (1987) (exploring regimes and their roles in international
relations).
34. See Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic oj
Two-Level Gaines, 42 INT'L ORG. 427 (1988); see also DOUBLE-EDGED
DIPLOMACY: INTERNATIONAL BARGAINING AND DOMESTIC POLITICS (Peter B. Ev-
ans et al. eds., 1993) (offering a more in-depth explanation of the relationship be-
tween international and domestic diplomacy).
35. See generally, IDEAS AND FOREIGN POLICY: BELIEFS, INSTI-rTUTIONS, AND
POLITICAL CHANGE 3-31 (Judith Goldstein & Robert 0. Keohane eds., 1993) (of-
fering a collection of essays dedicated to explaining that ideas affect, and ulti-
mately explain, political outcomes in foreign policy).
1357
AM. U. INT' L. REV[
ship has provided ample analysis of how international regime do-
mains have contributed to progressive social science regarding inter-
national relations-even if some these works offer little more than
intellectual "mopping-up," in the pithy prose of Thomas Kuhn.3'
However, an unfortunate result for international relations
scholarship has been that the study of IGOs has advanced theoreti-
cally and conceptually at a much slower pace than other aspects of
international regimes. The international regime has emphasized
states and their national policy institutions, ideas (principles and
norms), treaties and agreements (rules), and decision-making proce-
dures, thus slighting IGOs. In the early years of the international re-
gime research program, two scholars explained that the field had
evolved cumulatively and progressively and that regime concepts
had become more interesting than the formal organizations." These
regime concepts remained more interesting to the field's mainstream.
For example, a recent scholarly policy monograph laid out a research
agenda in support of "deeper integration" among states along con-
ventional international regime lines.38 Its companion monograph
pointed out that transportation and communication technology ad-
vances and already-achieved national trade policy liberalization de-
mand even "deeper integration" through regional as well as multilat-
eral institutional means. Yet, the monograph does not provide
theoretically-grounded explanations or analytic frameworks, and ap-
parently accepts the conventional research agenda as well.'
36. See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 1103
(2d ed. 1970). For an excellent bibliography of studies associated with the interna-
tional regime research program, see International Organization at Fifty: Explora-
tion and Contestation in the Study of World Politics 52 INT'L ORG. 645 (Peter J.
Katzenstein et al. eds., 1998).
37. See Friedrich Kratochwil & John Gerard Ruggie, International Organiza-
lion: A State of the Art on an Art of the State, 40 INT'L ORG. 753, 774-75 (1986)
(explaining that international organizations are turning away from standard inter-
national institutions and focusing on international behavior instead).
38. See MILES KAHLER, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF INTEGRATION 11-18, 77-79 (1995) (presenting a discussion on the
role of international institutions in economic change).
39. See ROBERT Z. LAWRENCE, REGIONALISM, MULTILATERALISM, AND
DEEPER INTEGRATION 28-33 (1996) (offering an analysis of the benefits of regional
arrangements).
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The international regime research program nevertheless has faced
criticism from the beginning. An essay in the original International
Regimes volume included an essay which assailed the concept as
"imprecise and wooly," "value-based," "static" and "narrow-
minded", and "rooted in a state-centric paradigm that limits vision of
a wider reality"; deeming it a "fad" offering "little in the way of
long-term contribution to knowledge. '"' In the same issue of Inter-
national Organization in which the international regime research
program was proclaimed a progressive step forward for the field, an-
other scholar declared bluntly: "[f]or the international organization
field, the concept of regime has meant almost intellectual chaos....
[T]he study of international organization has become broadly defined
as the study of patterns of international cooperation and conflict;
rendering it indistinguishable from the study of international poli-
tics.",
41
One critic bemoaned the shift from the study of international gov-
ernmental organizations to international regimes for having spewed
ambiguous explanations of cooperation and conflict. He rallied for
further studies of the interactions among IGO secretariats and the
national governmental bureaucracies in order to attain a "concrete
understanding of how cooperation happens." Studies appeared
which analyzed international regimes with barely any reference at all
to the international governmental organizations. For example,
Gilbert Winham explained the Tokyo Round multilateral trade nego-
tiations wholly without reference to the GATT secretariat or its ex-
ecutive head.4 1 In contrast, two previous books, regarding earlier
40. Susan Strange, Cave! hic dragones: A Critique of Regime Analysis,
INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 337, 337-54 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., Cornell Univ.
Press 1983) (criticizing the concept of the international regime research program).
41. J. Martin Rochester, The Rise and Fall of International Organization as a
Field of Study, 40 INT'L ORG. 777 (1986). Rochester provides an excellent citation-
rich analysis of the international organization research tradition from its origins in
the thought of Dante, Bentham, and Kant through the contributions of nineteenth
century peace and war scholars as well as the seminal functionalist international
relations scholars of the 1930s through the 1950s.
42. Pierre De Senarclens, Regime Theory and the Study of International Or-
ganizations.
43. See WINHAM, supra note 2, at 363-401. In a back cover blurb, Robert Ko-
hane described the book as "definitive."
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rounds of trade negotiations from the 1960s and 1970s, provided
such references.' Similarly, a recent study of the 1986-1994 Uru-
guay Round negotiations argued that the GATT Secretariat deci-
sively contributed to the agreement outcomes of the Round .
That IGOs conduct activities and perform roles in the international
relations system was only cursorily noted throughout the interna-
tional regime analysis of the past two decades. Presumably, scholars
• • 46
deemed the role of IGOs as insignificant. Theoretical and concep-
tual neglect likely accounts for empirical neglect. A fuller under-
standing of the function of IGOs in promoting multilateral coopera-
tion is sorely needed.
The function of IGOs should be delineated beyond the facile ex-
planation that international regimes "facilitate agreement" by "re-
ducing transaction costs. '47 An IGO is an organization composed of
people; it exists in brick and mortar to perform certain tasks of serv-
ice to its state-member constituents and to the world community.
First, IGOs gather, analyze, and disseminate information. For ex-
ample, the IMF and the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development ("World Bank") are the premier providers of world
economic information even in a "knowledge-based" world economy
with highly developed financial markets and sophisticated private
sector economic information providers.
Second, IGOs provide a forum for administrative and research
support for the negotiation of new rules by its members. For exam-
ple, information and analysis provided by the Food and Agriculture
44. See CURZON, supra note 2 at 48-53 (providing examples of books that refer
to the GATT General Director and Secretariat staff).
45. See Michael P. Ryan, The Function-Specific and Linkage-Bargain I)iplo-
macy of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON.
L. 535 (1998) (explaining how to integrate economies to achieve efficiency and
growth); see also RYAN, supra note 3.
46. Ernst Haas, one of the leaders in the study of IGOs before and after the ad-
vent of the international regime conceptual framework, wrote a supportive essay in
the original INTERNATIONAL REGIMES volume. He does not seem not to have seen
any logical conflict, nor do I. See Haas, Words Can Hurt You; or, Who Said What
to Whom about Regimes, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 23, 60 (Krasner, ed. Cornell
Univ. Press 1983).
47. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
1360 [15:1347
2000] INTERNATIONAL Go VERNMENTAL ORGA.VIZrI TIONS
Organization ("FAO") was critical to GATT Uruguay Round multi-
lateral trade negotiations regarding sanitary and phytosanitary stan-
dards.
Third, IGOs provide administrative and legal support for its mem-
bers regarding rule compliance and dispute settlement. For example,
the World Trade Organization ("WTO") legal staff advises dispute
settlement panelists and appellate body members regarding trade law
when member states submit their conflicts for adjudication.
Fourth, IGOs provide administrative services to the members. For
example, the World Health Organization ("WHO") offers public
health advice and policy support and UNESCO helps education in-
stitution-building in many developing countries.
Fifth, IGOs formally institutionalize social norms and values held
by its membership. For example, the UN General Assembly
("UNGA") issued numerous declarations in opposition to Portugal
clinging to its colonial possessions long after decolonization was
otherwise completed and in opposition to the apartheid policies of
the government of South Africa.
III. ORGANIZATIONAL THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
MANAGEMENT
Private enterprises exist because they manage knowledge better
than unrestricted markets and are as efficient as competitors. Private
enterprises decline and eventually expire when they fail to manage
knowledge better than unrestricted markets or competitors. Even in
our age of the Internet, when knowledge is "out-there" and available
seemingly at will, knowledge, ever-embedded into organizations and
managed through deliberate strategies, is the ultimate source of com-
petitive advantage.
Business enterprises are much more than depositories of discrete
facts. Business enterprises are neither dictionaries nor databases;
they are "know-how" institutions in the commercial marketplace.
They possess the organizational capabilities to turn information and
know-how into customer-valued products and services. Management
practitioners and scholars contend that knowledge management,
which has always been relevant to business success, has now become
vital in our era.
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As the world economy becomes increasingly integrated and com-
petitive, doing business becomes increasingly complex. Technolo-
gies are changing rapidly, fomenting turbulence in commercial mar-
kets. As a result, competitive advantages are increasingly difficult to
sustain. Thus, knowledge management is a central purpose for lead-
ership and organization of commercial enterprise.
Human knowledge cannot be encompassed in a single technique,
discourse, or discipline.4' Human understanding has over time be-
come differentiated like goods and services in a marketplace, divided
into disciplines and sub-disciplines, trans-disciplinary fields and sub-
fields, organized and compartmentalized, not merely for the sake of
convenience, but to promote cognition itself. Organization and com-
partmentalization are not static and fixed, but dynamic and mutable.49
Knowledge and learning capabilities tend to become institutionalized
as sector-specific knowledge, organizing principles, and governance
structures and these patterns of sectoral competitiveness tend to es-
tablish their path-dependent trajectories." Technological innovation
similarly tends to be patterned along natural trajectories" because
technological paradigms prescribe directions for further research and
development, and incremental innovation. This excludes other possi-
ble paths.52
The collective knowledge, know-how, and learning of an organi-
48. See Stephen Toulmin, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING: THE COLLECTIVE USE
AND EVOLUTION OF CONCEPTS 7 (1972) (explaining that boundaries of different
academic disciplines result from existing divisions of intellectual authority).
49. See id. at 113-160.
50. See Herbert Kitschelt, Industrial Governance Structures, Innovation
Strategies, and the Case of Japan: Sectoral or Cross-National Comparative Analy-
sis?" 45 INT'L ORG. 453, 455-56 (1991) (stating that each of the four paradigms,
the "classic" approach, modified "classic" approach, sectoral approach, and the
modified sectoral approach each have a different theory as to why this is the case);
see generally MICHAEL J. PIORE AND CHARLES F. SABEL, THE SECOND
INDUSTRIAL DIVIDE: POSSIBILITIES FOR PROSPERITY (1984).
51. For a discussion of these trajectories, see RICHARD R. NELSON AND SIDNEY
G. WINTER, THE EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF THE ECONOMIC CHANGE (1982).
52. For an explanation of this phenomenon, see Giovanni Dosi, Technological
Paradigms and Technological Trajectories, I I RES. POL'Y 147 (1982).
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zation have been said to be its "core competence."" The sum of an
organization's core competence is greater than its parts. The organi-
zation possesses knowledge-based capabilities, which yield a com-
petitive advantage and produce goods and services. It is an artifact of
organization, not of an individual, making it difficult for a competitor
to emulate. Core competence is the product of organizational leader-
ship, structure, and process; whereas knowledge is integrated within
organizational behaviors and routines in order to create and sustain
capability." This drives organizational strategy, including product or
service selection and delivery, organizational design, and human re-
source management.
Organizations possess "knowledge assets" which may be catego-
rized into specific domains of competencies." Establishing taxonomy
of knowledge specific to a particular organization affords access, dif-
fusion, and dissemination as well as identification of knowledge gaps
or misfits within core competency. These knowledge assets may be
explicit, such as written articulations of a design or formula, but of-
ten are tacit, existing in the "heads" of staff members.
The challenge of extracting and utilizing knowledge from its staff
members is an important aspect of knowledge management for or-
ganizations. Articulation of knowledge domains and the organiza-
tional exercise of developing the categories can facilitate information
sharing amongst the members of the organization. Discrete knowl-
edge may be deemed proprietary intellectual property, to be pro-
tected by technical means and organizational procedures with respect
to relevant intellectual property laws. Knowledge management in-
volves decisions about what knowledge to shield and what knowl-
53. See C. K. Prahalad and Gary Hamel, The Core Competence of the Firm, 68
HARv. Bus. REv. 79, 82 (1990) (defining core competencies as the "collective
learning the of the organization").
54. See Robert M. Grant, Prospering in Dynanmically-Competitive Environ-
nients: Organizational Capability as Knowledge Integration, 7 ORG. Sci. 375
(1996).
55. See, e.g. Edward Rubin, The New Legal Process. the Synthesis of Dis-
course, and the Microanalysis of Institutions. 109 HARV. L.REV. 1393, 1413
(1996) (noting that in an institutional setting, most individuals do not act as indi-
viduals, but rather as members of a complex organization whose motivations, be-
haviors, and knowledge are highly affected by their institutional settings).
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edge to disseminate. An organization's competitive advantage ulti-
mately rests upon its capacity to learn as an organization."'
Learning is "largely an information-processing activity in which
information about the structure of behavior and about environmental
events is transformed into symbolic representations that serve asS ,,17
guides for actions. In other words, it is the result of simple proc-
esses of replacement. "Problem-solving," on the other hand, requires
greater leaps of mental replacement (such as analogy). "Innovation"
requires the greatest leaps of mental replacement. Yet, nevertheless,
both problem-solving and innovation are forms of learning.
Learning may be "observational," i.e., the outcome of the percep-
tion of someone else's experience or "experiential," i.e., the outcome
of the trial-and-error of one's own experience. 8 According to educa-
tional psychologists, learning is dependent upon cognition and moti-
vation. 9 Cognition is the learner's ability to process information-
selection, acquisition, construction, and integration. Motivation
means the learner's goals, sense of efficacy or control, and
expectancy for success. The two are interdependent and dynamic, as
cognitive structures and learning strategies relate to personality and
motivation characteristics.
Individual learning relates to, but is not identical to, organizational
learning. Organizations are more than collected individuals; organ-
izational learning is more than collected individual learning.6 An or-
ganization learns when "encoding inferences from history into rou-
tines that guide behavior;". "routines" being rules, norms, procedures,
56. See Linda Argote, ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING: CREATING, RETAINING
AND TRANSFERRING KNOWLEDGE (1999); PETER SENGE, THE FIFTH DISCIPLINE:
THE ART AND PRACTICE OF THE LEARNING ORGANIZATION (1990).
57. ALBERT BANDURA, SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS OF THOUGHT AND ACTION: A
SOCIAL COGNITIVE THEORY 50 (1986).
58. Seeid. at 51, 106.
59. For a discussion on what drives learning, see Lyn Corno and Richard E.
Snow, Adapting Teaching to Individual Differences among Learners in
HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON TEACHING (Merlin C. Wittrock ed. 1986); Paul Pin-
trich et al., hIstructional Psychology, 47 ANN. REV. OF PSYCHOL. 611 (1986).
60. For a distinction between the two forms of learning, see Daniel H. Kim,
The Link between Individual and Organizational Learning, 35 SLOAN MGMT. REv.
37(1993).
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beliefs, paradigms, and codes.6 Organizational learning depends
upon organizational characteristics, including complementary or-
ganizational notions of "climate" and "culture." Organizational cli-
mate means characteristics of size, structure, complexity, reward-
structure, leadership style, and resource-base. Organizational culture,
in contrast to organizational climate, refers to values, attitudes, ap-
preciation systems, behavior patterns, local knowledge-the "way
we do things around here." 62 Characteristics of climate and culture
may either encourage or inhibit the cognition essential to leaming.
Organizational learning depends upon the existence of "shared
mental models" or "consensual knowledge" (akin to the "cognitive
structures" of individual learning), which encourage the integration
of new knowledge into organizational routines."' Shared mental
models for knowledge management, the seminal characteristics of
organizational culture, promote the communication of new informa-
tion and learning within the organization. The lack of such models
makes the communication of new information and learning within
the organization exceedingly difficult. However, even when shared
mental models do exist, they do not erase the intra-organizational
cultural differences that exist within any sizable group of people. For
purposes of communication toward organizational learning, these
cultural differences must be overcome.
Nevertheless, cultural differences within an organization are to be
welcomed, not erased. Innovation means finding creative, new solu-
tions to problems--effective organizations seek to innovate new
products and services and to innovate the ways they deliver these
products and services. Since innovative societies apparently value
autonomy, diversity, and rational method," it may well be that inno-
61. Barbara Levitt and James G. March, Organizational Learning, 14 ANN.
REv. OF SOC. 319 (1988).
62. Edgar H. Schein, C(oming to New Awareness of Organizational Culture, 25
SLOAN MGMT. REV. 3 (1984); see also ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AND
LEADERSHIP (1992); Alan L. Wilkins and William G. Ouchi, Efficient Cultures:
Exploring the Relationship benveen Culture and Organizational Perlorfnance, 28
ADMrN. Sci. Q. 468 (1983).
63. Kim, supra note 60, at 43.
64. For evidence of this common link between innovative societies, see Huff,
supra note 6.
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vative organizations value individual autonomy and encourage staff
members to consider new ideas and possible new solutions. Further-
more, innovative organizations value staff diversity, individuals who
bring different, if complementary, knowledge-sets, experiences, and
cultural attitudes. Diversity creates a vigorous internal marketplace
of ideas, which can, if given some order and discipline by manage-
ment, produce creative problem solving.6 5 Organizations must value
reasoned, analytical experiment and rational, scientific method. Val-
ues of individual autonomy, diversity, and experiment become insti-
tutionalized characteristics of organizational climate.
Organizational learning and knowledge management begin with
the organization's capacity to ensure that the correct new information
is acquired. In previous eras of less rapid change in the organiza-
tional milieu, an organization could succeed when a cadre assumed
responsibility for knowledge acquisition, such as one or two "scan-
ners" or "contact people" trusted by the organizational leader or by
the organizational leaders themselves. 6 Increasingly, however,
knowledge management requires that an organization have a design
and culture where everyone within the organization shares in the re-
sponsibility for bringing new information into the organization. The
new model of knowledge management designs organizational struc-
tures and processes with the intent to create a learning culture. Mem-
bers of the organization participate in outside-the-organization op-
portunities for new knowledge acquisition, ranging from formal
mechanisms such as conferences and seminars to informal know-
how trading opportunities such as social gatherings. 7 Professional
and technical staff augment their knowledge acquisition through par-
65. See Maureen T. Hallinan, Diversity Effects on Student Outcomes: Social
Science Evidence, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 733, 751-33 (1998) (explaining that contact
between diverse groups can lead to improved relationships between persons who
differ by race and ethnicity; that a commitment to diversity fosters a desire to work
together to achieve common goals).
66. See HAROLD L. WILENSKY, ORGANIZATIONAL INTELLIGENCE: KNOWLEDGE
AND POLICY IN GOVERNMENT AND INDUSTRY 10 (1967) (stating that those chosen
as "contact men" were valued for such things as their knowledge of the political,
social and cultural ideas of the society and for their ability to mediate between the
organization and the outside world).
67. See Eric von Hippel, Cooperation Among Rivals: Informal Know-Hlow
Trading, 16 RES. POL'Y 291 (1987).
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ticipation in transnational "epistemic communities" of like-educated,
common knowledge domain people who share information.i' Appro-
priate reward systems are designed to motivate staff members to ac-
quire new information and learning.
Knowledge management starts with the acquisition of new infor-
mation. Ultimately, however, knowledge management depends upon
the capacity of the organization to transform the raw information into
actionable knowledge; individual learning into organizational learn-
ing. 69 Knowledge management and organizational learning demand
the institutionalization of communication systems within the organi-
zation. Effective communication systems "push" and "pull" knowl-
edge within the organization. Moreover, they employ techniques of
organizational structure such as cross-functional teams and of infor-
mation technologies such as electronic mail. Formal training pro-
grams contribute to effective communication and help build the or-
ganizational capacity to learn. Communication techniques are
designed to mesh with organization-specific tendencies of climate
and culture.
The capabilities of new information and communication technol-
ogy create new potential for knowledge management. When printed
matter mail and voice telephony were the primary means of commu-
nication, managers across distant locales could not always get the
right information at the right time. Telephony service revolutionized
twentieth-century communication and has been fundamental to the
industrial age, but it has become capable of much more at the dawn
of the new century. The telephone has been converging with the
computer and the computer has become a communication device due
to the Internet.
In little more than a generation, information technology has been
revolutionized by the microchip and digital compression.7i The for-
68. See Peter M. Haas, Banning Chloroflourocarbons: Epistemic Community
Efforts to Protect Stratospheric Ozone, 46 INT'L ORG 187 (1992).
69. The following paragraphs are based upon conversations with Professor
Paul Almeida of the Georgetown University School of Business.
70. For a history of these technology advances, see MICHAEL S. MALONE, THE
MICROPROCESSOR: A BIOGRAPHY (1995); NICHOLAS NEGROPONTE, BEING
DIGITAL (1995).
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mer put extraordinary information processing and storage capacity
into offices and homes during the period of 1975 to 1995; the latter
took incompatible means of computation and communication-te-
lephony, broadcast television, cable, wireless-and made them speak
the same languages of ones and zeros, establishing a new network
era.' Network computing and communication network computing
represent a revolution in information-distribution capabilities.
Communication techniques include electronic mail and electronic
data exchange, video conferencing, mail, telephone and fax delivery
systems, and face-to-face meetings. Each technique possesses a
trade-off with respect to its capacity for information delivery, the
breadth of information delivery, the richness of information delivery,
and the formality of information delivery. The communication and
information technology revolution is transforming both workplace
and marketplace,72 making knowledge management truly possible.




FOR MULTILATERAL ECONOMIC LAWMAKING
IGOs possess certain features common to most organizations, in-
cluding leadership by an executive head and administration through a
formal structure of bureaucracy called a "secretariat." The executive
head of an IGO will be effective only if the shoals of member state
relations, bureaucratic management, and milieu conditions can be
navigated. 73 An IGO executive head helms an organization with sub-
stantial information gathering capabilities and organizational capaci-
71. For a discussion of how the computer and microchip changed information
distribution, see generally GLOBALIZATION, TECHNOLOGY, AND COMPETITION:
THE FUSION OF COMPUTERS AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN THE 1990s (Stephen P.
Bradley et al. eds., 1993).
72. To understand these changes, see THE FUTURE OF SOFTWARE (Derek Lee-
baert ed., 1995); and THE FUTURE OF THE ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE (1998).
73. See Robert W. Cox, The Executive Head. An Essay on Leadership in Inter-
national Organization," in INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION: POLITICS AND
PROCESSES 155 (Leland M. Goodrich and David A. Kay, eds., 1973).
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ties. Accordingly:
The key task for any executive head is to use his strategic location in his
organization's communication network and the platform his position af-
fords-him to mobilize a consensus in support of organizational goals. How
influential an executive head will be depends in large measure on his suc-
cess in performing this task. The dimensions of the task vary with circum-
stances and time, and prescriptions for success have been highly individ-
ual. 74
An IGO may perform for its constituents services across a wide
range of issue domains of international relations, earning the label
"general function IGO." Conversely, an IGO may perform services
regarding a narrow set of closely related issue domains, receiving the
label "specific function IGO." IGOs such as the UNGA, the Asso-
ciation of Southeast Asian Nations, and the Group of 77 ("G-77") are
general function organizations, which take up issues ranging from
peace and security to economy and human rights. IGOs such as the
1LO, the International Telecommunications Union ("ITU"), and the
Food and Agriculture Organization ("FAO") are specific function
organizations, which concentrate on the issue domains indicated by
their names. Special-function IGOs greatly outnumber general func-
tion IGOs-hundreds of the former (sixty-one percent economic,
twenty-eight percent social, ten percent security/military) to a few of
the latter (two percent of the total population). "
In general, IGOs play a variety of roles in international relations.
A particular IGO, however, tends to be mainly a rulemaking forum,
such as the UNGA or WTO,76 or a provider of services, such as the
examples of the World Bank and the WHO. The dominant purpose
74. ROBERT W. COX AND HAROLD K. JACOBSON, THE ANATOMY OF
INFLUENCE, DECISION MAKING IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 398 (1973).
75. See Shanks et al., supra note 12, at 601.
76. See, e.g. Ndiva Kofele-Kale, The Principle oflPreferential Treatment in the
Law of GATT: Toward Achieving the Objective of an Equitable World Trading
System, 18 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 291, 327 (1997/1998) (noting that, according to
some scholars, UNGA resolutions can have as much legal effectiveness as trea-
ties).
77. See, e.g. Keith Clark, Sovereign Debt Restructurings: Pariy of Treatment
Between Equivalent Creditors in Relation to Comparable Debts, 20 INT'L LAW
1369
AM. U. INT' L. REV.
of the IGO shapes its service delivery and knowledge management
practices.
Compared to typical organizations, IGOs possess some unusual
characteristics. The national identities of IGO staff members vary
widely and IGO decision-makers navigate through complicated pro-
cesses involving organization insiders and outsiders. External influ-
ences extensively influence mission, activity, and life at IGOs. An
organization is an "open system" which, like a biological organism,
evolves interdependent with its milieu.78 An organization has perme-
able boundaries such that organization and milieu develop together.
Structure and process of organization-authority relationships, rules,
routines, and operational procedures-are established for effective-
ness given particular milieu circumstances. The milieu of interna-
tional politics and relations, the world economy, transnational cul-
tural patterns, social stratification, and technology changes strongly
shape the context in which IGOs operate.
Most fundamentally, however, national governmental representa-
tives extensively influence the mission, activity, and life at the IGO
through constitutional claim. National governments found the IGO
either directly or through other IGOs, establishing in its charter its
mission, rules of decision-making, and basic organizational func-
tions. More importantly, national governments frequently select the
executive head and may influence selection of senior and even junior
staff. National governments influence programs, activities, adminis-
trative practices, and budgets. IGOs are not sovereign actors; they are
constrained by their member states, as wells as events upon world
political and economic stage. However, IGO executive heads do
857, 859 (1986) (explaining that the World Bank provides services such as inter-
national soft loans).
78. For an explanation of how organizations are interdependent, see DANIEL
KATZ AND ROBERT L. KAHN, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF THE ORGANIZATIONS
(1966); FREMONT E. KAST AND JAMES E. ROSENZWEIG, ORGANIZATION AND
MANAGEMENT: A SYSTEMS AND CONTINGENCY APPROACH 103, 103-142 (1985).
79. See HAROLD SPROUT & MARGARET SPROUT, THE ECOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVE ON HUMAN AFFAIRS (1965) (recommending that the term "milieu" be
used to emphasize the political, economic, and social dimensions rather than "envi-
ronment," which tends to conjure in people's minds meanings associated with
ecology, natural resources, and pollution).
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have substantial sources of power that can be leveraged to guide the
organization's behavior and role in facilitating multilateral coopera-
tion.
From its inception in the late 1940s through the 1970s, GATT
primarily existed to facilitate multilateral trade cooperation by host-
ing rounds of tariff reduction negotiations among the industrialized
countries. During the 1970s, the GATT members established a mul-
tilateral trade negotiation ("MTN") in order to reduce non-tariff bar-
riers to trade. Non-tariff barriers posed a special challenge to trade
negotiators as they were difficult to measure and, hence, tricky to
evaluate their impact. Nonetheless, Tokyo Round negotiators were
able to create "linkage" opportunities provided by the round's broad
ability to formulate important trade policy agreements.' At the con-
clusion of the Tokyo Round, the GATT MTN was hailed as the birth
of the most important institutional innovation in world trade since the
creation of the GATT itself.8'
During the 1970s, the GATT confronted demands from develop-
ing countries for a New International Economic Order which would
entail fundamental reform of the concepts underlying the trade re-
gime, though what developing countries received was a more modest
set of new rules regarding contingent-exemptions from GATT rules
and tariff preferences.8 Developing countries presented proposals for
restructuring the world political economy at the first UN Conference
on Trade and Development in 1964. They demanded trade prefer-
ences for their manufactured goods, commodity price stabilization,
resource and technology transfers, reduction in freight and service
80. See Gilbert R. Winham, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE TOKYO ROUND
NEGOTIATION 371, 371-375 (1986) (explaining that an interesting feature of the
Tokyo Round was the trade-offs, or linkages that were established between various
issues and that linkages are an important mechanism for promoting agreement in
negotiation).
81. See John H. Jackson, The Birth of the GATT-MTN Svstem: A Constitutional
Appraisal, 12 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 21 (1980) (stating that the MTN was the
first significant negotiation effort to address problems of non tariff measures af-
fecting international trade since the GATT was first established).
82. For illumination on what developing countries gained through the reforms
of the 1970s, see ROBERT E. HUDEC, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE GATT
LEGAL SYSTEM (1987).
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charges, debt rescheduling and reductions, and a new forum to re-
place GATT.83 Inspired by the success of the Organization of Petro-
leum Exporting Countries' ("OPEC") oil cartel in 1973-74, a group
of seventy-seven developing countries used their numbers in the UN
to vote in a Declaration on the Establishment of the New Interna-
tional Economic Order ("NIEO"). As the UN had one-nation-one-
vote decision-making, unlike the weighted-voting IMF and World
Bank and the rarely voting GATT, the G-77 succeeded in passing
their manifesto. The declaration contained policy preferences and as-
serted the right to nationalize foreign business enterprises, create
commodity cartels, and regulate multinational corporations. 4 The G-
77 used the UNCTAD forum to establish raw materials and agricul-
tural cartels-the Commodity Common Fund ("CCF")-which
aimed to monitor and manage supply, demand, and therefore, prices.
The CCF created stocks of the commodities as a means to manage
the supply, modeled after OPEC's success with the oil cartel."s
The GATT's attempts to solve the economic problems of devel-
oping countries in the 1960s and 1970s were largely feeble. The sole
exception was the tariff-cutting offered by the Generalized System of
Preferences, which were trade preferences valuable to developing
country exporters even if critics charged that importers manipulated
the system for their own benefit. Neither the Kennedy Round nego-
tiations in the 1960s nor the subsequent Tokyo Round negotiations in
the 1970s contributed much to development. If anything, these nego-
tiations sometimes adversely affected developing country interests,
such as the antidumping and subsidy/countervailing duty agreements
83. In order to understand the desires of developing nations at the conference,
see UNCTAD AND THE SOUTH-NORTH DIALOGUE: THE FIRST TWENTY YEARS
(Michael Zammit Cutajar ed., 1985); THOMAS G. WEISS, MULTILATERAL
DEVELOPMENT DIPLOMACY IN UCTAD: THE LESSONS OF GROUP NEGOTIATIONS
1964-1984 (1986).
84. For an explanation of the G-77's declaration, see Anindya K. Bhattacharya,
The hfluence of the International Secretariat: UNCTAD and Generalized Tariff
Preferences, 30 INT'L ORG. 76 (1976).
85. To understand the methods CCF employed, see Robert L. Rothstein, Re-
gime-Creation by a Coalition of the Weak: Lessons from the NIEO and Integrated
Program for Commodities, 28 INT'L STUD. Q. 307 (1984); JOCK A. FINLAYSON &
MARK W. ZACHER, MANAGING INTERNATIONAL MARKETS: DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES AND THE COMMODITY TRADE (1990).
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and the Multi-fiber Agreement.
During the 1980s, the GATT trading regime confronted challenges
less fundamental in terms of economic philosophy but more threat-
ening with respect to international relations. Namely, the United
States government complained that its dispute settlement capabilities
were inadequate. Indeed, GATT dispute settlement procedures were
often hostage to recalcitrant states."' Accordingly, dispute settlement
reform became an important priority of the Uruguay Round MTN
initiated in 1986. Fundamental procedural reforms were institution-
alized by a 1994 agreement of the membership.'
In the 1980s, non-tariff barriers challenged the GATT institution
even more than in the previous decade, becoming an important pri-
ority of the leading governments within GATT membership. The
GATT members also challenged the regime to facilitate trade barrier
reduction and policy harmonization in areas new to GATT diplo-
macy, including trade in services and the so-called "trade-related"
economic policy issues of intellectual property and investment. The
successful Uruguay Round culminated in a series of significant
agreements. The members founded the WTO, phased out the Multi-
fiber Arrangement, reduced agricultural trade barriers, brought a
framework agreement to trade in services, and established minimum
standards for intellectual property protection, all due to the breadth
of the Uruguay agenda and the linkage bargain diplomacy practiced
by GATT and other IGO secretariats.
The 130-plus WTO member states are planning a new round of
multilateral trade negotiations. Multilateral trade negotiations have
become complex affairs in international relations with more than 130
members of the WTO. More importantly, the issues placed on the
negotiation agenda are many and concern a wide range of economic
policy matters. Possible new round issues include intellectual prop-
erty rights, environment, labor, corruption, health, safety, product ef-
86. For an explanation of how these procedures were abused, see ROBERT E.
HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY (1990).
87. For a list of these procedural reforms, see HANDBOOK OF WTO GATT
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (Pierre Pescatore et al. eds., 1998).
88. For a list of the headquarters and functions of these IGOs, see the
APPENDIX.
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ficacy regulation, competition regulation, and electronic commerce.
The WTO, if it is to fulfill its role as a rules-promulgation forum
for its membership, will cooperate with other functionally specific
IGOs. These IGOs will include: UNCTAD, the World Bank, WIPO,
the UN Environment Program ("UNEP"), ILO, WHO, FAO, Inter-
national Standards Organization ("ISO"), and ITU. "
CONCLUSION
Our conception of IGOs as knowledge-managers refocuses atten-
tion on IGOs, positing them as objects of legitimate and ever-
important study. We follow a course set by Ernst Haas who placed
knowledge in the center of the life and study of IGOs. 89 However, as
Haas candidly admits, he merely offered a set of concepts and a ty-
pology, not a grounded theory of IGOs. We argue that knowledge
accumulation and management of the IGO is central to the shared-
knowledge of an international regime. Therefore, the IGO is the cru-
cial cooperation-facilitating institution in any given area of interna-
tional relations.
Studying IGOs as organizations, which manage knowledge in
support of multilateral trade and economic lawmaking processes, in-
forms both state-centered international relations scholarship con-
ducted by political scientists and rule-centered international law
scholarship conducted by legal scholars. Thus, we offer a conceptual
bridge between these two complementary, but often disjointed areas
of scholarship. 0 Furthermore, studying IGOs on this level informs
non-state-centered international relations scholarship as well. Trans-
national epistemic communities, affiliations of technical specialists,
and knowledge-intensive public and private organizations are vital
contributors to international trade and economic lawmaking negotia-
89. To understand the importance Haas placed on knowledge, see ERNST B.
HAAS, WHEN KNOWLEDGE IS POWER: THREE MODELS OF CHANGE IN
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION (1990).
90. For a discussion of this newly evolved hybrid of scholarship, see Anne-
Marie Slaughter et al., International Law and International Relations Theory: A
New Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 367 (1998).
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tions.9'
We focus on the role of IGOs as participants in epistemic commu-
nities, serving a fundamental role in knowledge creation and dis-
semination. As the new multilateral trade negotiation round is
planned by the member states of the WTO, preparatory work has be-
gun with analysis by the Brookings Institution, the Council on For-
eign Relations, and the Institute for International Economics.'2 These
policy monographs indicate that the new round agenda will likely be
the most ambitious yet, thereby challenging the WTO to provide a
forum support function for these negotiations. None of these policy
monographs have addressed the expanse of the information and
knowledge management needs of the proposed negotiations. Nor
have the monographs noted the knowledge-management capabilities
of the WTO or the institutional capacity of the WTO to provide a ne-
gotiation forum for so many issues of international trade policy.
It has been 25 years since the last major comparative study of
IGOs. Our conception of IGOs as knowledge managers calls for the
intensive study of IGOs in order to investigate their competencies,
knowledge management capabilities, and organizational capacities.
Policymakers, practitioners, and scholars must know more about
where to find information. They must understand the competencies,
analytical capacities, and knowledge management capabilities of the
key IGOs.
Further study regarding people and organizations, rather than in-
formation and data, will provide vital new information to national
policymakers regarding the capacities and capabilities of their IGOs.
Moreover, it will inform staff, executive heads, member govern-
ments, and non-governmental organizations participating in initia-
tives to improve knowledge management at IGOs. Study will inform
new entrants when they join the WTO and the scholarship of acces-
91. For an explanation of these contributions, see KNOWLEDGE, POWER, AND
INTERNATIONAL POLICY COORDINATION (Peter M. Haas ed., 1992).
92. For examples of such preparatory work, see TRADE STRATEGIES FOR A NEW
ERA: ENSURING U.S. LEADERSHIP IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY (Geza Feketekuty and
Bruce Stokes eds., 1998); BROOKINGS TRADE FORUM (Robert Z. Lawrence ed.,
1998); LAUNCHING NEW GLOBAL TRADE TALKS: AN ACTION AGENDA (JetTrey J.
Schott ed., 1998).
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sion, contributing important understanding regarding the form and
function of IGOs.
APPENDIX
The headquarters and function of the above IGOs are as follows:
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION ("WTO"), Geneva: the central in-
stitution of world trading system; the forum host for a new multilat-
eral trade negotiation round.
UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT
("UNCTAD"), Geneva: secondary institution of the world trading
system but important to developing countries; possesses substantial,
if perhaps underutilized, analytical capabilities.
WORLD BANK, Washington, DC: undergoing a transformation
from a multilateral investment bank to a multilateral "knowledge in-
stitution" regarding development; possesses extensive knowledge
management capabilities, especially regarding developing countries.
WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION ("WIPO"), Ge-
neva: the key multilateral institution regarding intellectual property;
a UN agency which provides services to multinational companies
and, thus, not dependent upon member contributions and possessing
wealth sufficient to provide extensive knowledge management capa-
bilities.
93. For examples of such scholarship, see HAROLD K. JACOBSON AND MICIIEL
OKSENBERG, CHINA'S PARTICIPATION IN THE IMF, THE WORLD BANK, AND GATT:
TOWARD A GLOBAL ECONOMIC (1990); LEAH HAUS, GLOBALIZING THiE GATT:
THE SOVIET UNION'S SUCESSOR STATES, EASTERN EUROPE, AND Till.
INTERNATIONAL TRADING SYSTEM (1992).
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UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAM ("UNEP"), Nairobi:
key multilateral institution regarding ecology and the environment;
administers important international environmental treaties.
INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION ("ILO"), Paris: key mul-
tilateral institution regarding labor; only IGO with member repre-
sentation from management and labor as well as national govern-
ments; establishes international norms regarding labor policies such
as work week and child labor practices.
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION ("WHO"), Geneva: key multilat-
eral institution regarding public health and health care with emphasis
upon developing countries; issues of pharmaceutical health, safety,
and efficacy regulation, biotech policy considered within the forum.
FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION ("FAO"), Rome: key
multilateral institution regarding the production of food and agricul-
tural products with emphasis upon developing countries; issues of
food standards and agricultural health and safety, biotech policy con-
sidered within the forum.
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS ORGANIZATION ("ISO"), Geneva:
key multilateral institution for the establishment of international
standards regarding products, infrastructure, and management pro-
duction processes; facilitates cooperation among private non-
governmental organizations and national public organizations.
INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS UNION ("ITU"), Geneva:
key multilateral institution for cooperation regarding international
communication infrastructure and policy; important institution re-
garding the development of electronic commerce.
UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC, AND CULTURAL
ORGANIZATION ("UNESCO"), Paris: key multilateral institution for
issues related to education, science, and culture, especially regarding
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developing countries; provides services to member countries to im-
prove educational and scientific institutions and to protect cultural
heritage.
